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1 Introduction 
The so-called Islamic State (IS) has a sophisticated media strategy (Winter 2017), 
an important part of which has been its English-language online magazine Dabiq. 
Launched in July 2014, a total of fifteen issues of Dabiq in the two years that 
followed. These issues were disseminated in a variety of ways, including archive 
sites (Bodo and Speckhard 2017), web forums and file-sharing networks (Gambhir 
2016), the dark web (Stacey 2017), and even via an attempt to sell the freely 
available magazines for profit through the online retailer Amazon (Masi 2015). One 
of the most important forums for dissemination, however, was the social media 
platform Twitter (Bodo and Speckhard 2017; Gambhir 2016; Cunningham, Everton 
and Schroeder 2015; Shaheen 2015). 
Released in July 2016, the theme of Dabiq issue 15 was ‘Break the Cross’. After 
referring to a number of attacks that had occurred in the preceding weeks, the 
issue’s foreword called on ‘pagan Christians’, ‘liberalist secularists’ and ‘sceptical 
atheists’ to ‘recognize their Creator and submit to Him’. In addition to regular 
features, including ‘Among the believers are men’ and ‘In the words of the enemy’ 
(which, in this issue’ focussed on Pope Francis), and advertisements for other IS 
media, issue 15 contained an 18 page feature article, also titled ‘Break the Cross’. 
Arguing that the Bible does not display the three hallmarks of a true divine text, the 
article discusses the doctrine of the Trinity, whether Jesus was crucified, and 
whether Paul’s New Testament teachings are authentic (repeatedly stating that 
Paul was a known liar). It then seeks to establish the authenticity of the Prophet 
Muhammad, before asking Christians rhetorically: ‘O People of the Scripture, follow 
the truth from your Lord, whom you claim to love. Would you follow your parents 
and ancestors if you knew they were walking into a fire?’ and concluding ‘Know 
well that our fight will continue until you are defeated and submit to the rule of 
your Creator, or until we achieve martyrdom. Allah has made our mission to wage 
war against disbelief until it ceases to exist, as he has ordered us to kill all pagans 
wherever they are found’.  
Drawing on an original dataset, in this article we examine the response to the 
release of Dabiq issue 15 on Twitter. We examine the response in two respects: 
first, the response from Twitter itself, in terms of suspension activity; and, second, 
the response from other users, in terms of their engagement with posts 
disseminating the new issue. Before presenting our findings, we begin by offering 
an overview of our methodology. 
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2 Methodology 
Dabiq issue 15 was first made available online on 31 July 2016. From this date, to the 
end of 24 August 2016, all Twitter posts mentioning the term ‘dabiq’, and the associated 
user data, were collected using Cardiff University’s ‘Sentinel’ research tool.1 From this 
data, the first Dabiq-mentioning post from each distinct user was extracted, as was the 
user’s profile data at the time of the post. The initial dataset thus covered a number of 
computer-generated variables, including the text of the tweet, the date and time at 
which it was posted, any links contained within it, the account name, the language in 
which the account was created, the date of creation and the number of followers. The 
account status (extant/suspended/deleted) at the end of the data collection period was 
also recorded. 
Over the 25 days of data collection, a total of 11,586 distinct user accounts posted 
58,056 Dabiq-mentioning tweets or retweets. 573 of these accounts had been 
suspended by the end of the data collection period. 
The first round of data analysis consisted of quantitative analysis of the overall dataset, 
supplemented by a careful reading of a (computer-generated) random sample of the 
data from 1000 accounts. Following an iterative, data-driven approach, a number of 
coding categories were then constructed based on this reading. These included: the 
presence of (positive or negative) statements about specific political 
figures/institutions or religions within the user’s profile; the mood of the captured post; 
any specific references to IS, jihad or terrorism within the user’s profile or the captured 
post; and the type of account (e.g., personal, journalist, official news feed). In the second 
round of analysis, these codes were applied to specific subsets of user accounts from 
within the larger dataset. These were as follows:  
• The original random sample of 1000 accounts 
• Arabic language accounts [n=292] 
• Suspended accounts [n=573] 
• Accounts subsequently closed by the user [n=70] 
• Accounts whose first post was unlinked to any other [n=2356] 
• Accounts whose first post was not a retweet [n=3271] 
• Accounts whose first post was not a retweet and also contained a link [n=1621] 
  
                                                        
1 For the purposes of this study, Sentinel functioned only as a repository of structured data supplied 
by the Twitter Streaming API. 
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The third round of analysis consisted of comparative analysis between these subsets 
and either the whole dataset or the random sample of 1000. In this article, we focus on 
the findings pertaining to two of these subsets: the accounts that had been suspended 
by the end of the data collection period; and, the accounts whose first post was not a 
retweet and also contained a link.  
3 Suspended accounts 
It is helpful to begin by setting out the relevant parts of Twitter’s suspension policy:  
Any accounts and related accounts engaging in the activities specified below may be 
temporarily locked and/or subject to permanent suspension. 
Violent threats (direct or indirect): You may not make threats of violence or promote 
violence, including threatening or promoting terrorism […] 
Hateful conduct: You may not promote violence against or directly attack or threaten other 
people on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender 
identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or disease. We also do not allow accounts 
whose primary purpose is inciting harm towards others on the basis of these 
categories (Twitter 2017). 
Twitter insists that it has applied this policy rigorously. In a press release issued in 
August 2016, it stated: 
We strongly condemn [terror attacks] and remain committed to eliminating the promotion 
of violence or terrorism on our platform … [Our work in the past six months] brings our 
overall number of suspensions to 360,000 since the middle of 2015. As noted by numerous 
third parties, our efforts continue to drive meaningful results, including a significant shift in 
this type of activity off of Twitter (Twitter 2016). 
A total of 360,000 suspensions in roughly a year is equivalent to approximately 
1,000 per day. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that our dataset included just 573 
suspended accounts (roughly 23 per day). In this regard, we offer three 
observations.  
First, the extract from Twitter’s suspension policy above uses the term ‘promoting 
terrorism’. Whilst issue 15 of Dabiq sought to promote terrorism, it seems clear from 
our findings that tweeting or retweeting a direct link to this terrorism-promoting 
publication is not in itself deemed sufficient to constitute the promotion of terrorism for 
the purposes of invoking the Twitter Rules. Instead, Twitter seemed to discriminate 
between Dabiq-disseminating accounts on the basis of the tone and objective of the 
  
  
 
 
 
    
    
  EUROPOL PUBLIC INFORMATION 5 / 11 
 
account and the content that it posted. Just eight (1.4%) of the 573 accounts within our 
dataset that were suspended were identified as being critical of IS, with a further 20 
(3.5%) classed as factual. Of the remaining accounts, 496 (86.6%) were sympathetic to 
IS (and it was not possible to categorise the other 49, principally due to the ambiguity of 
their wording). So, Twitter appears to be willing to have terrorism-promoting content 
accessible on its platform, as long as those disseminating this content are not 
themselves promoters of terrorism. 
The number of suspensions within our dataset is noteworthy for a second reason: it 
indicates a relatively low level of IS activity on Twitter. As recently as 2014, it was 
estimated that there were between 46,000 and 70,000 IS supporter accounts on 
Twitter, and that on average these were tweeting 133,422 times per day (Berger and 
Morgan 2015). Since then, Twitter has clamped down on the use of its platform by IS 
supporters, as indicated by its press release above. Research into the impact of this 
clampdown has found that it was effective in significantly reducing IS activity on 
Twitter (Berger and Perez 2016; Bodine-Baron et al 2016; Bolton 2016). Our findings 
offer further support for this conclusion. At the time of the publication of issue 15, Dabiq 
was the flagship English-language IS publication.2 The fact that IS was only able to rally 
a few hundred accounts to promote and disseminate issue 15 suggests that its ability to 
operate impactfully on Twitter has been greatly diminished. 
Third, the account creation dates and number of followers of the suspended accounts in 
our dataset are also indicative of IS’s diminished ability to operate on Twitter. Of the 
573 suspended accounts, 490 (85.5%) were created in the third quarter of 2016, i.e., 
just weeks prior to, or following, the release of issue 15. In addition to being young, 
these accounts had low follower levels, as Table 1 shows. 
 Suspended accounts Overall dataset 
Lowest number 0 (69 accounts) 0 (112 accounts) 
First quartile 5 109.75 
Median 26 399 
Third quartile 86.5 1424 
Highest number 1511 1105832 
Mean 81 2769 
Table 1: Number of followers, suspended accounts and overall dataset 
                                                        
2 No further issues of Dabiq have been published in the last nine months. Since September 2016, it 
appears to have been replaced by a new online magazine, Rumiyah. 
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The suspended accounts’ median number of followers was just 26 (compared to a 
figure of 399 for the dataset as a whole). More than three-quarters of the 
suspended accounts had fewer than 100 followers. And, in addition, these accounts 
had all been suspended by the end of our data collection period (24 August 2016). 
These findings thus support Twitter’s claim, made in August 2016, that its 
‘response time for suspending reported accounts, the amount of time these 
accounts are on Twitter, and the number of followers they accumulate have all 
decreased dramatically’ (Twitter 2016).  
4 Externally linking original posters 
A search for Dabiq issue 15 using Twitter’s built-in search feature will not return 
any results from accounts that have been suspended or deleted by the account 
holder. Similarly, any such search will not return content from extant accounts that 
has been removed by the account holder. Beyond this, however, any content from 
an extant account that has not been removed by the account holder will be 
searchable. In this section, we therefore explore the content relating to Dabiq issue 
15 that remains searchable on Twitter, and offer two observations. 
First, in spite of the suspension activity outlined above, issue 15 of Dabiq remains 
accessible on Twitter. Within our dataset, there were a total of 1621 accounts 
whose first post about Dabiq: (a) contained original content (i.e., was not merely a 
retweet); and, (b) included a link to an external site. Of these, a total of 1370 
(84.5%) remained extant at the end of the data collection period. Across these 1370 
accounts, a total of 778 distinct links were identified. Analysis of the most common 
100 of these links reveals that: (a) 39 of them either linked directly to issue 15 of 
Dabiq, or to a site from which it could be accessed; and, (b) one of these 39 links 
was included in the tweet posted by 250 of the 1370 extant accounts. Moreover, the 
actual number of extant accounts whose post included either a direct link to Dabiq 
issue 15 or a link to a site from which it could be accessed is likely to be 
significantly higher than 250, since our analysis was limited to the 100 most 
common links. In particular, our count does not include unique URLs that appeared 
only once in the dataset. In many instances, these unique URLS will have been 
generated by a URL shortener in order to subvert detection mechanisms.  
The other 61 of the 100 most common links were almost exclusively links to news items 
and blogs. Whilst these did not provide a direct link to Dabiq issue 15, they frequently 
offered a glimpse into the magazine’s contents. Many contained the magazine’s front 
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cover as well as quotes, screenshots or other content from within its pages. Some also 
pointed out to readers that it is straightforward to obtain a copy of the magazine. 
Our second observation concerns the tone of the content posted by these externally 
linking accounts that remain extent. As Figure 1 below shows, the content posted by just 
over one-half of these accounts was critical in tone. So, even though these users 
expressed opposition to IS and Dabiq magazine – often in emotive terms – they 
nonetheless included a link, either to a news item or blog or to a copy of the magazine 
itself. 25% were factual in tone – simply reporting the fact that the new issue had been 
released – and for 22% of accounts it was not possible to discern the mood, often 
because the wording of the post was ambiguous. Just 1% of the accounts expressed 
sympathy for the message of Dabiq. 
 
Figure 1. Qualitatively coded mood of the first post from holders of an extant account 
and whose first post contained original content and linked to external content. 
Table 2 shows the most common political and religious statements found within the 
profile descriptions of the 1370 extant accounts that posted original content including 
an external link. The most common type of political statement was pro-Trump (6.1%), 
followed by pro-Israel (4.2%), whilst the most common type of religious statement was 
pro-Christian (10.1%). This latter finding reflects the specific focus of this issue of 
Dabiq: ‘Break the Cross’. It was also evident that there was an inter-relationship 
between these three types of statement, with a number of account holders self-
identifying as Christians who supported Trump and/or were pro-Israel. 
Most common political statements Most common religious statements 
Pro-Trump 6.1% Pro-Christian 10.1% 
Pro-Israel 4.2% Anti-Islam 3.4% 
Anti-Clinton 1.8% Pro-Atheism 1.9% 
Pro-Liberal 0.7% Pro-Islam 1.7% 
Table 2: Account profiles, most common political and religious statements 
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Lastly, three-quarters of the posts from these 1370 accounts were in the English 
language, which is unsurprising given that Dabiq is an English-language publication. 
More unexpected is the finding that the remaining 25% spanned a total of 26 different 
languages, the most common being French, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese and Spanish (5%, 
5%, 3%, 3% and 2% respectively). It is noteworthy that none of these languages 
originate from areas that are under the control of IS. 
5 Conclusion 
It is sometimes asserted that efforts to suppress terrorism-promoting accounts on 
social media face an insurmountable difficulty: the fact that when one account is 
closed, users can simply create another, then another, and then another. However, 
research by Berger and Perez (2016) has shown that this whack-a-mole problem 
has been overstated. Finding that ‘Returning accounts rarely reached their previous 
heights’, they concluded: ‘suspensions typically had a very significant detrimental 
effect on these repeat offenders, shrinking both the size of their networks and the 
pace of their activity’ (ibid, 9). Our study offers further support for this conclusion. 
The suspended accounts within our dataset, which were overwhelmingly 
supportive of IS, were largely very young accounts with relatively low numbers of 
followers, and were suspended before they gained much of a following. 
Our findings point instead to a different challenge. The number of IS sympathisers 
that were proactively trying to disseminate the new issue of Dabiq was relatively 
small. However, there were more than twice as many other, non-sympathiser 
accounts that also posted links to the new issue or discussion of it. Moreover, these 
accounts were still extant at the end of our data collection period. Plus, the total 
number of accounts that posted tweets and retweets about the new issue was 
nearly 20 times greater than the number of sympathiser accounts that were 
suspended. And that’s just the number that tweeted or retweeted; there will be 
many more who saw these tweets and read them without posting anything. In 
short, the IS sympathisers who disseminated issue 15 of Dabiq caused a fairly small 
splash; it was others that caused the ripples to travel a long way. 
We conclude by identifying an area for further research. It is well-documented that 
Dabiq seeks to ‘Other’ the West by employing an us versus them discourse (see, e.g., 
Ingram 2016; Lorenzo-Dus et al 2017). In the light of this, it is concerning to us that the 
predominant response on Twitter to Dabiq issue 15 from non-sympathisers was not 
only to increase awareness of the new issue, and even provide a direct link to a copy, 
but also to engage in a similarly ‘Othering’ discourse. Whilst further content analysis 
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needs to be conducted to assess the extent to which this concern is empirically justified, 
there is a danger here that by responding in kind oppositional voices risk exacerbating 
already-existing tensions and reinforcing the very divisions that IS seeks to generate 
and exploit in its recruitment efforts.  
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